Professor Matthew Leisinger

mleising@yorku.ca
Office Location:  S441 Ross Building
Phone Number:  (416) 736-2100 Ext. 77592
Office Hours:  Tuesdays 3:00–4:00 in Ross S441 (in-person) or by appointment via Zoom.

Most of us simply take it for granted that, at least under ordinary circumstances, we have a certain control over our actions and, as a result, that we can appropriately be held responsible for what we do—in other words, we usually take it for granted that we possess free will. This natural self-conception, however, is remarkably fragile: What exactly does this sense of control amount to? And how can we possibly possess any such control if all of our actions are causally determined by forces that obviously are not within our control? This is the perennial philosophical problem of free will and determinism. In this course, we will examine the challenge that determinism appears to pose to free will as well as a variety of responses to that challenge.

Technical requirements for taking the course:

All readings will be made available via eClass as PDF files, so students will be required to have internet access and the ability to download and read PDF files. All written assignments will be submitted to TurnItIn via eClass.

All required readings will be available online via eClass.

Two short writing assignments: 10% + 20% = 30%

Two short exams: 15% + 25% = 40%

Final paper: 30%

This is an in-person course. Lectures will be held in-person twice a week.

This course aims to introduce students to philosophical debates concerns freedom, determinism, and responsibility and also to develop their philosophical abilities of reading, writing, and argumentation.

Classes begin Monday Jan 9

Week 1 (Jan 11 & 13): Introduction

Thomas Nagel. 1987. “Free Will.” In What Does It All Mean? A Very Short Introduction to Philosophy, 47–58. New York: Oxford University Press.

Week 2 (Jan 17 & 19): Compatibilism

1954. J. Ayer. [1946] 1954. “Freedom and Necessity.” In Philosophical Essays, 271–284. London: Palmgrave Macmillan.

Week 3 (Jan 24 & 26): Incompatibilism

Peter Van Inwagen. 1975. “The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism.” Philosophical Studies 27, 185–199.

Week 4 (Jan 31 & Feb 2): Agent-causal libertarianism

Roderick M. Chisholm. [1964] 2001. “Human Freedom and the Self.” In Agency and Responsibility: Essays on the Metaphysics of Freedom, edited by Laura Waddell Ekstrom, 126–137. New York:

Week 5 (Feb 7 & 9): Event-causal libertarianism

Robert Kane. 1999. “Responsibility, Luck, and Chance: Reflections on Free Will and Indeterminism.” The Journal of Philosophy 96 (5), 217–240.

Week 6 (Feb 14 & 16): Event-causal libertarianism (continued)

Waddell Ekstrom. 2003. “Free Will, Chance, and Mystery.” Philosophical Studies 113, 153–180.

Thursday February 16: Midterm Exam (In Class)

Winter Reading Week (Feb 18–24)

Week 7 (Feb 28 & Mar 2): The principle of alternate possibilities

Harry Frankfurt. 1969. “Alternate Possibility and Moral Responsibility.” The Journal of Philosophy 66 (23), 829–839.

Week 8 (Mar 7 & 9): Hierarchical compatibilism

Harry Frankfurt. 1971. “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.” The Journal of Philosophy 68 (1), 5–20.

Week 9 (Mar 14 & 16): Reasons-responsiveness compatibilism

John Martin Fischer. 2013. “My Compatibilism.” In The Philosophy of Free Will: Essential Readings from the Contemporary Debates, edited by Paul Russell and Oisín Deery, 296–317. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Week 10 (Mar 21 & 23): Manipulation

Selections from: Derk Pereboom. 2007. “Hard Incompatibilism.” In Four Views on Free Will, edited by John Martin Fischer, Robert Kane, Derk Pereboom, and Manuel Vargas, 85–125. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.

Week 11 (Mar 28 & 30): Strawsonian Naturalism

Peter Strawson. [1962] 1982. “Freedom and Resentment.” In Free Will, edited by Gary Watson, 59–80. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Week 12 (Apr 4 & 6): Hard incompatibilism

Derk Pereboom. 1995. “Determinism al Dente.” Noûs 29 (1): 21–45.

Classes end Monday Apr 10

Winter examinations (Apr 12–27)