Dylan Ludwig
dylan.m.ludwig@gmail.com
N821 Ross Building
Office Hours:  Tuesdays, 12:30-1:30 (or by appointment)

This seminar will examine the last few decades of philosophical and scientific research aimed at understanding consciousness as a feature of natural systems. We will look at both foundational and contemporary contributions to a range of different debates in cognitive science surrounding the nature and function of conscious experience, examining such accounts as Global Workspace, Higher-Order Thought, Information Integration, and Recurrent Processing theories. We will focus our discussions around major philosophical issues in the field, but we will also consult relevant empirical work in psychology and neuroscience, given the interdisciplinary nature of contemporary consciousness research.

TBA

Attendance and Participation 10%-Attendance will be taken each class, and it is important to show up to each class ready to discuss the assigned reading material.

Reading Responses 30%-(Due at noon day of class) You will be asked to submit 3 short reading response papers (worth 10% each) that will address topics that arise in the weekly assigned readings. These will be no more than 2 double-spaced pages, submitted to Turnitin BY NOON on the day of class where we will discuss the relevant readings. See Reading Schedule for specific dates.

Paper Outline 10%-(Due February 28^th) You will be asked to submit an outline for your final paper idea, no more than 2 double-spaced pages, that includes an abstract with thesis statement and outline of the main argumentative strategy, and a short literature review.

Presentation 10% (March 28^th)-Students will deliver a short presentation of their paper idea and receive constructive feedback from the class.

Final Paper 40%-(Due April 18^th) Submit a final paper to Turnitin, 10-12 double-spaced pages, normal formatting and citation rules apply.

Reading Schedule

Week 1 (January 10): Introduction to Consciousness Research, Progress and Problems

Week 2 (January 17): Global Workspace Theories ***Reading Response Due***

• Baars, B. J. (1988). Chapter 2: Model 1-Conscious Representations are Internally Consistent and Globally Distributed. A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness. Cambridge University Press. Pages 71-118.
• Baars, B. J. (1988). Chapter 3: The Neural Basis of Conscious Experience. A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness. Cambridge University Press. Pages 71-118.

Week 3 (January 24): Global Workspace Theories

• Dehaene, S. (2014). Chapter 2: Fathoming Unconscious Depths. Consciousness and the brain: Deciphering how the brain codes our thoughts. Viking. Pages 56-99.
• Dehaene, S. (2014). Chapter 3: What is Consciousness Good For? Consciousness and the brain: Deciphering how the brain codes our thoughts. Viking. Pages 100-126.

Week 4 (January 31): Higher-Order Thought Theories ***Reading Response Due***

• Lau, H. C. & Rosenthal, D. M. (2011). Empirical support for higher-order theories of conscious awareness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 15(8): 365-373.
• Brown, R., Lau, H., & LeDoux, J. E. (2019). Understanding the higher-order approach to consciousness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 23(9): 754-768.
• Cleeremans, A., Achoui, D., Beauny, A., Keuninckx, L., Martin, J. R., Muñoz-Moldes, S., Vuillaume, L., & de Heering, A. (2020). Learning to Be Conscious. Trends in cognitive sciences, 24(2), 112–123.

Week 5 (February 7): Challenges for Cognitive Theories

• Block, N. (2019). What is wrong with the no-report paradigm and how to fix it. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 23(12), 1003-1013.
• Boly, M., Massimini, M., Tsuchiya, N., Postle, B. R., Koch, C., & Tononi, G. (2017). Are the neural correlates of consciousness in the front or in the back of the cerebral cortex? Clinical and neuroimaging evidence. The Journal of Neuroscience, 37(40): 9603-9613.

Week 6 (February 14): The Overflow Debate ***Reading Response Due***

• Block, N. (2011). Perceptual consciousness overflows cognitive access. Trends in Cognitive Sciences15 (12):567-575.
• Odegaard B, Chang MY, Lau H, Cheung SH. Inflation versus filling-in: why we feel we see more than we actually do in peripheral vision. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci. 2018 Sep 19;373(1755):20170345.
• Usher, M., Bronfman, Z. Z., Talmor, S., Jacobson, H., & Eitam, B. (2018). Consciousness without report: insights from summary statistics and inattention ‘blindness’. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 373(1755), 20170354.

Week 7 (February 21): READING WEEK-NO CLASSES

Week 8 (February 28): Information Integration Theory ***PAPER OUTLINE DUE***

• Tononi, G. & Koch, C. (2015). Consciousness: here, there, and everywhere?  Trans. R. Soc. B370, 20140167.
• Koch, C. (2019). Excerpts. The Feeling of Life Itself: Why Consciousness is Widespread but Can’t Be Computed. MIT Press, Cambridge.

Week 9: (March 7) : Challenges for Information Integration Theory

• Mudrik, L., Faivre, N., & Koch, C. (2014). Information integration without awareness. Trends in cognitive sciences, 18(9), 488-496.
• Brogaard, B., Chomanski, B., & Gatzia, D. E. (2021). Consciousness and information integration. Synthese, 198(3), 763-792.

Week 10 (March 14): Recurrent Processing Theories

• Lamme, V. (2020). Visual Functions Generating Conscious Seeing. Frontiers in psychology, 11, 83.
• Malach, R. (2021). Local neuronal relational structures underlying the contents of human conscious experience. Neuroscience of consciousness, 2021(2), niab028.

Week 11 (March 21): The Function(s) of Consciousness

• Lau, H., Michel, M., LeDoux, J. E., & Fleming, S. M. (2022). The mnemonic basis of subjective experience. Nature Reviews Psychology, 1-10.
• Cleeremans, A., & Tallon-Baudry, C. (2022). Consciousness matters: phenomenal experience has functional value. Neuroscience of Consciousness, 2022(1), niac007.

Week 12 (March 28): Student Presentations

Week 13 (April 4): Wrap Up Discussion

Syllabus subject to change given sufficient notice

TBA